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In L.A. County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a 
Ninth Circuit holding that navigable water passing through a 
concrete channel does not constitute “discharge” under the 
Clean Water Act.1 This case had the unusual distinction of 
having the petitioner and respondent agree on the proper 
judgment. As Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion noted, “the 
parties and the United States as amicus curiae agree [with the 
result].”2 After the Court described the outcome as “hardly 
surprising” in light of existing precedent,3 one Supreme Court 
litigator and commentator publicly wondered “why the Court 
bothered setting the case for briefing and argument, rather than 
just summarily reversing, given that all the parties have agreed 
on the answer to the question presented from the beginning.”4 
But the case included another oddity: despite the unanimous 
judgment, it was not a unanimous opinion because Justice 
Samuel Alito had it noted without explanation that he “concurs 
in the judgment.”5 
 
 * Associate Professor of Political Science, Utah State University. Thanks to Sara 
Benesh, Nicole Vouvalis, and participants at the 2015 annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association for helpful comments. 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 711. 
 3. Id. at 713. 
 4. Kevin Russell, Opinion Analysis: The Court Unanimously Agrees With 
Everyone Else, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/01/opinion-analysis-the-court-unanimously-agrees-with-everyone-else/.  
 5. L.A. County Flood Control District, 133 S. Ct. at 714. See also Russell, supra 
note 4 (“The second odd part of the case is that Justice Alito concurred in the 
judgment—meaning he agreed with the result, but did not join in the Court’s reasoning—
but wrote no concurring opinion to explain what part of the Court’s analysis he disagreed 
with.”). 
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The silent concurrence is a puzzling institutional practice for 
several reasons.6 By definition it provides no explanation for 
why a Justice agrees with the judgment but refuses to join the 
majority opinion. As a result, silent concurrences conflict with 
the norm that opinions are the primary currency by which judges 
translate their preferences into law.7 Moreover, this practice is 
puzzling because Justices have several low-cost alternatives to 
noting concurrence. As an initial matter, Justices might issue 
perfunctory opinions that offer a brief explanation for staking 
out a separate position. As a circuit court judge, for example, 
Alito once had it noted that he “concurs in the judgment for 
essentially the reasons given by the District Court.”8 Although 
readers may have to turn elsewhere, such as to a lower court 
opinion, for explanation, a perfunctory opinion at least provides 
some indication of the judge’s thinking. Alternatively, there is a 
long history of Justices silently acquiescing in opinions with 
which they disagree.9 
Why do Justices sometimes choose to note their 
concurrence in the result without explanation rather than go 
along silently with the majority opinion or write separately? This 
question has received little attention, most likely because it is 
inherently difficult to answer without access to private 
information. Of course, one might observe Justice Alito’s silent 
concurrence in L.A. County Flood Control District and quickly 
 
 6. This practice is also referred to as a “noted concurrence.” This nomenclature 
may be due to the fact that Justices will ask the majority opinion author to “note” 
concurrence or dissent at the end of a majority opinion rather than filing a separate 
opinion with the printer.  
 7. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as 
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993). 
 8. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 831 (3d Cir. 2003) (Alito, J., concurring). 
Perfunctory concurrences are occasionally issued by Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (“Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the 
judgment on the ground that this state measure bears a rational relation to a 
constitutionally permissible objective.”). 
 9. See Greg Goelzhauser, Graveyard Dissents on the Burger Court, 42 J. SUP. CT. 
HIST. 188 (2015) [hereinafter Goelzhauser, Graveyard]; Greg Goelzhauser, Silent 
Acquiescence on the Supreme Court, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 3 (2015) [hereinafter Goelzhauser, 
Silent]. See also Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001) (detailing silent acquiescence on the Waite Court); John P. 
Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 
WASH U. L.Q. 137, 143–52 (1999) (discussing reluctance to dissent on the Marshall 
Court); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal 
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1344 (2001) 
(describing a “norm of acquiescence” on the Taft Court). 
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surmise that the case’s unusual posture and comparative 
unimportance had something to do with his decision.10 But this 
offers little in the way of explanation. After all, other cases that 
have unusual postures or are comparatively unimportant do not 
generate silent concurrences. Moreover, the case’s posture or 
importance does not provide any information about why Alito 
refused to join the majority opinion. This is also exactly the type 
of case where we are more likely to observe Justices who 
disagree with the majority go along silently without publicly 
indicating any opposition.11 
In this Article, I leverage private information to explain why 
Justices silently concur. Specifically, I utilize the private papers 
of several Justices who served during the Burger Court, OT 
1969-OT 1985.12 Using these private papers, I find that a variety 
of factors influence decisions to concur silently. Time constraints 
and perceptions about case importance are among the most 
important determinants of concurring silently. In addition, silent 
concurrences may be driven by vote switching and uncertainty 
about the proper disposition or legal rule, a desire to maintain a 
consistent voting record and withhold support for disfavored 
precedents, and bargaining failures over opinion language and 
scope. Silent concurrences may also be driven by a combination 
of those factors. Before addressing these determinants in more 
detail, the next section illuminates the underlying puzzle with a 
brief discussion of concurring opinions. 
I. WRITTEN VERSUS SILENT CONCURRENCES 
Concurring opinions are a mainstay in Supreme Court 
decision making. As the consensual period of Supreme Court 
decision making came to a close in the early twentieth century, 
Justices increased their production of concurring and dissenting 
opinions.13 With a regular concurring opinion, a Justice writes 
 
 10. In light of its unusual posture, it would not be surprising to learn that Alito 
preferred to dismiss the case as improvidently granted or summarily reverse rather than 
hear oral arguments.  
 11. See Goelzhauser, Graveyard, supra note 8. 
 12. These papers are archived online as part of The Supreme Court Opinion 
Writing Database. Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, The 
Supreme Court Opinion Writing Database, http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu (last 
visited March 26, 2016). All referenced papers are available electronically in the archive. 
 13. See, e.g., PAMELA C. CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT, & ARTEMUS WARD, THE 
PUZZLE OF UNANIMITY: CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2013); 
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separately but also joins the majority opinion; with a special 
concurring opinion, a Justice agrees with the judgment reached 
by the majority but disagrees about the justification for reaching 
that result. Concurring opinions, whether regular or special, 
come in a variety of forms. They might be written to limit or 
expand the majority opinion, propose an alternative legal theory, 
or make an idiosyncratic point.14 
Written concurrences, like written dissents, are potentially 
valuable for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, a 
concurring opinion may prove to be highly influential in the 
subsequent development of law. Among the best known is 
Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer15 delineating a three-part framework for 
analyzing the constitutional validity of unilateral executive 
actions.16 Even if the opinion’s influence is not immediate, a 
written concurrence may have downstream effects on the 
development of law and over time come to be influential. 
Of course, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence is the 
exception not the rule. Most concurrences do not find their way 
into the constitutional law canon. Nonetheless, it is not 
uncommon for written concurrences to shape the development 
of law at the margin. As noted previously, written concurrences 
can help frame the majority opinion by suggesting limiting or 
expansive interpretations. Empirical evidence suggests that 
written concurrences can play an important role in determining 
the extent to which lower courts comply with majority 
opinions.17 Thus, written concurrences can be valuable insofar as 
they provide signals to lower court judges about how to interpret 
precedent. More immediately, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the 
Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874 (1998); Epstein et al., supra note 8; Marcus E. 
Hendershot et al., Dissensual Decision Making: Revisiting the Demise of Consensual 
Norms Within the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RES. Q. 467 (2013); Mark S. Hurwitz & 
Drew Noble Lanier, I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus, Agendas, and Policymaking on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 1888-1999, 21 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 429 (2004); Thomas G. 
Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States 
Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988).  
 14. See PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT (2010); Laura Ray Krugman, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the 
Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777 (1990). 
 15. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 16. 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 17. CORLEY, supra note 14. 
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once noted about separate opinions generally, “they may 
provoke clarifications, refinements, [and] modifications in the 
court’s opinion.”18 
Written concurrences also allow Justices to communicate 
their sincere preferences. Commentators have long disagreed 
about the extent to which legal, policy or strategic goals guide 
judicial decision making.19 Regardless, Justices that agree with 
the result of a case but not the reasoning must write separately in 
order to communicate their sincere preferences. Moreover, as 
Justice Antonin Scalia once noted, writing separately allows for 
“writ[ing] an opinion solely for oneself, without the need to 
accommodate, to any degree whatever, the more-or-less 
differing views of one’s colleagues; to add precisely the points of 
law that one considers important and no others; to express 
precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding, or disbelief, or 
indignation that one believes the majority’s disposition should 
engender.”20 In this way, separate opinions stand in stark 
contrast to majority opinions, which are often the product of 
compromise in order to maintain or enlarge a winning coalition. 
Legitimacy and reputation-enhancing effects also flow from 
separate opinions.21 This occurs in at least two ways. First, 
written opinions are the primary currency through which Justices 
build their reputations. Justices who refuse to write opinions 
aside from assigned majority opinions miss out on opportunities 
to enhance their professional standing. Second, written opinions 
provide a measure of public accountability. Indeed, some judges 
are required to justify their votes. For example, the California 
constitution requires “[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and 
courts of appeal that determine causes [to] [] be in writing with 
reasons stated.”22 Although Article III judges enjoy life tenure 
during good behavior, political actors and the public nonetheless 
 
 18. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 
143 (1990). 
 19. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BRETT W. CURRY, & BRYAN W. 
MARSHALL, DECISION MAKING BY THE MODERN SUPREME COURT (2011); JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED (2002).  
 20. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 42 (1994) 
(emphasis removed). 
 21. See id. at 39–41.  
 22. CAL. CONST. ART. VI, § 14. 
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play a substantial role in shaping judicial decision making 
through informal appeals and formal institutional attacks.23 
Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task of 
maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.24 
All of these justifications for not merely going along with 
the majority disposition and opinion despite disagreement have 
one thing in common: benefit accrual requires Justices to write 
separate opinions. This makes the silent concurrence especially 
puzzling. Moreover, the existing literature on separate opinion 
writing lends little insight into why Justices would decide to 
concur without explanation. Although recent research offers 
insight into why Justices sometimes silently acquiesce to the 
majority position despite disagreement,25 concurring without 
explanation is a fundamentally different practice insofar as it 
involves a Justice noting disagreement but refusing to explain 
the reasons underlying this disagreement. A leading opinion-
writing treatise recognizes the practice of silently concurring, but 
criticizes it for “cast[ing] doubt on the principles declared in the 
main opinion without indicating why they are wrong or 
questionable.”26 
The most comprehensive study of noting disagreement 
without explanation focuses exclusively on Justice William O. 
Douglas’s voting behavior in tax cases and other select matters 
concerning economic regulation.27 Although sometimes 
remembered first for his colorful public law opinions, Douglas 
came to the Court with considerable experience in private law 
fields such as business organizations and finance.28 Drawing on 
the economic expertise he developed in private practice, as a 
professor at Yale Law School, and as Chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Justice Douglas made substantial 
contributions to the Court’s jurisprudence on corporate 
 
 23. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC 
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 24. See Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 140. 
 25. See Goelzhauser, Silent, supra note 9; Goelzhauser, Graveyard, supra note 9. 
 26. B. E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS (1977). 
 27. BERNARD WOLFMAN, JONATHAN L.F. SILVER, & MARJORIE A. SILVER, 
DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN 
FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975). 
 28. See generally Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on 
Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 (1964). 
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reorganizations, securities regulation, and tax. Although 
Douglas “devoted considerable time and thought to the writing 
of tax opinions”29 early in his career, he tended to merely note 
disagreement in later years.30 Unfortunately, Douglas’s reasons 
for noting disagreement without explanation are not clear from 
the study—undoubtedly because the behavior cannot be 
explained without access to private information. 
Professor Corley’s leading study of concurrences and their 
consequences refers to the practice of noting concurrence as an 
“unnecessary concurrence,”31 and demonstrates that these silent 
concurrences occurred irregularly from 1986 through 1989.32 
Although this study provides important insights into the causes 
and consequences of concurring opinions, the question of why 
Justices sometimes silently concur was beyond its scope. Again, 
the difficulty scholars have encountered with this practice is that 
published opinions are inherently unable to provide much 
insight into why Justices concur without explanation. As Corley 
notes after proposing general explanations for decisions to 
silently concur, “because the Justice has not revealed why he or 
she is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible 
reason.”33 The next section looks to uncover the reasons 
motivating these decisions. 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SILENT CONCURRENCES 
As noted previously, public information such as published 
opinions do not provide information about the reasons for 
noting concurrence by definition. To learn more about this 
puzzling practice, I leverage the private papers of Justices 
serving during the Burger Court. These archival records offer 
unique insights into judicial behavior. The records indicate that 
silent concurrences may be driven by time constraints, 
perceptions about case importance or the importance of a 
prospective concurring opinion, vote switching, uncertainty 
about the proper disposition or legal rule, a desire to maintain a 
consistent voting record and withhold support for disfavored 
precedents, and bargaining failures over opinion language and 
 
 29. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 20. 
 30. Id. at 27.  
 31. CORLEY, supra note 14, at 19.  
 32. Id. at 32.  
 33. Id. at 19. 
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scope. Often more than one of these factors combines to 
motivate silent concurrences. 
Before proceeding it is important to clarify that all of the 
cases discussed here involve special concurrences, or 
concurrences in the judgment but not the majority opinion. 
Regular concurrences, where a Justice joins the majority opinion 
but also writes separately, are not silent concurrences by 
definition since the act of joining the majority opinion provides 
information about the Justice’s thinking. Indeed, the notion of a 
silent regular concurrence seems to be a conceptual impossibility 
since the only reason for issuing a regular concurrence is to 
make or emphasize some point.34As a result, this section seeks to 
explain the puzzle of Justices noting their concurrence in the 
judgment while refusing to join the majority opinion without 
offering any public explanation for their posture. 
A. IMPORTANCE AND TIME CONSTRAINTS 
The existing literature demonstrates that Justices may 
refrain from writing dissenting opinions when they disagree with 
the majority position if the opportunity cost of doing so is too 
high.35 Time constraints or belief that a case or prospective 
opinion is not particularly important may supply motivation for 
refusing to write. Justice Ginsburg once explained, with respect 
to writing separate opinions, that judges “operate under one 
intensely practical constraint: time.”36 Ginsburg added: “In 
collegial courts, one gets no writing credit for dissenting or 
concurring opinions; however consuming the preparation of a 
separate opinion may be, the judge must still carry a full load of 
opinions for the court. Dissents or concurrences are written on 
one’s own time.”37 Moreover, comparatively unimportant cases 
and prospective opinions necessarily receive less attention.38 
These factors also seem to influence decisions to concur 
without explanation. In Engle v. Isaac, the Court held that 
 
 34. In contrast, the silent (special) concurrence withholds a vote from the majority 
opinion. Of course, one might describe an unpublished regular concurrence as a “silent 
concurrence,” but that would be an example of acquiescence rather than a “silent 
concurrence” as that phrase is used here.  
 35. Goelzhauser, Silent, supra note 9; Goelzhauser, Graveyard, supra note 9.  
 36. Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 142. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Goelzhauser, Silent, supra note 9; Goelzhauser, Graveyard, supra note 9. 
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defendants could not litigate a constitutional claim in a federal 
habeas proceeding that had been forfeited in state court by 
failing to object contemporaneously at trial.39 After Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court attracted a majority, Justice 
Blackmun wrote: “You have my vote, too, if you could make the 
following changes.”40 Blackmun then listed five specific 
requests.41 O’Connor later responded: “I am circulating a draft 
with several revisions which I hope will alleviate several of your 
concerns,” though she noted a “reluctan[ce] to delete footnote 
32 and all of the text on page 23” as Blackmun had requested.42 
O’Connor added: “I hope you will consider joining the opinion 
with the proposed changes, and perhaps merely noting 
separately your view as to the language on page 23 and in 
footnote 32.”43 Blackmun responded: “My primary difficulty 
with your opinion is footnote 32. I therefore shall not join your 
opinion. At the end of the next draft, please show the following: 
‘Justice Blackmun concurs in the result.’”44 Although Blackmun 
did not explain his reason for merely concurring, it is plausible 
that he thought it too tedious to write an opinion—however 
perfunctory—focusing on a single footnote.45 
A noted concurrence in Hathorn v. Lovorn46 may have been 
jointly motivated by a perception of case importance and time 
 
 39. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). 
 40. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor, No. 80-1430 (Mar. 
11, 1982), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1430.pdf. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor, No. 80-1430 (Mar. 
12, 1982), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1430.pdf. 
 45. On occasion, however, Justices have joined all of an opinion except a single 
footnote. Indeed, Blackmun once had it noted that he joined all of an opinion written by 
Justice O’Connor except for a single footnote. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Com’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 576 (1983). The text of footnote 32 is not 
clear from the records. In the published opinion, footnote 32 seems to be a fairly 
innocuous one noting authority for the proposition that the “absence of 
finality…frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 n.32 
(1982). Footnote 33, however, which may have been moved one place during revision, is 
more notable. It criticized the Court’s creation of “novel [constitutional] claims” for 
defendants “[d]uring the last two decades,” and lamented that “[s]tate courts are 
understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to 
have a federal court discover…new constitutional commands.” Id. at 127 n.33. The note 
added: “Indiscriminate federal intrusions may simply diminish the fervor of state judges 
to root out constitutional errors on their own.” Id.  
 46. 457 U.S. 255 (1982). 
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constraints. In Hathorn, the Court held that a state court could 
not order implementation of a change in election procedure 
without ensuring compliance with the Voting Rights Act.47 
Notwithstanding the Voting Rights Act’s general importance, 
Justice Powell seemed to consider the specific issue raised by 
Hathorn to be comparatively unimportant and fact bound. After 
Justice O’Connor circulated a draft opinion for the Court on 
May 29, 1982, Powell wrote to Rehnquist, both of whom were of 
the view at Conference that Congress did not intend to have 
state courts enforce the Voting Rights Act: “I have read 
Sandra’s opinion. My disposition is simply to join in the 
judgment. The case is a ‘sport’ that should never have been 
granted. I see no purpose, however, in dissenting—especially at 
this season of the year.”48 After Rehnquist nonetheless 
circulated a brief dissent on June 3, Powell wrote to O’Connor 
on June 4, with the end of Term nearing, informing her that he 
would like it noted at the end of the opinion that he joined the 
judgment.49 
Another silent occurrence that seemed to be jointly 
motivated by time constraints and end-of-term pressures 
occurred in Robbins v. California.50 In Robbins, the Court 
reversed a lower court judgment upholding the constitutional 
validity of a search of a closed container found inside a vehicle’s 
luggage compartment during a lawful but warrantless search. 
After apparently passing at Conference, Chief Justice Burger 
sent a memorandum to the Conference indicating his vote to 
reverse, and drawing a distinction between a vehicle’s “interior” 
(including “jackets, pockets, packages, containers, glove 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. Letter from Lewis F. Powell to William Rehnquist, No. 81-451 (May 31, 1982), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/81-451.pdf. The word 
“sport” seems to indicate that a case is fact specific. See, e.g., Letter from John Marshall 
Harlan II to Warren E. Burger, No. 32 (Nov. 12, 1969) (“[A] case which is as much of a 
‘sport’ as this one is not deserving of a full-dress opinion, and therefore would hope that 
another vote could be garnered simply to dismiss the case as improvidently granted.”); 
Memorandum from William Rehnquist to the Conference, No. 72-656 (May 9, 1973) 
(suggesting the case posed “a question of undoubted importance to the litigants, but 
certainly a ‘sport’ if there ever was one in this general area of law”); Letter from William 
Rehnquist to Stevens, No. 77-477 (Oct. 30, 1978) (suggesting he would be content with a 
DIG if the case were a “sport,” but noting that “these cases will recur [and] there will be 
constant conflicts”). 
 49. Letter from Lewis F. Powell to Sandra Day O’Connor, No. 81-451 (June 4, 
1982), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/81-451.pdf. 
 50. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
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compartments”) and “the trunk or the area under the hood.”51 
Thus, Burger’s decision to reverse seems to have been based on 
the fact that the container was inside the vehicle’s luggage 
compartment rather than the interior. On June 3, 1981, Justice 
Stewart (having received the assignment from Burger in the 
above-referenced memorandum) circulated a first draft of an 
opinion for the Court. On June 10, Burger wrote to Stewart: “I 
contemplate joining but with a few ‘observations.’”52 Two days 
later, Burger wrote again, this time formally joining Stewart’s 
opinion and unveiling a four-paragraph regular concurrence.53 
On June 22, Burger wrote to Stewart again to note that he was 
“having some ‘second thoughts’ on my concurring opinion.”54 
The following day Burger sent a personal note to Justice Powell 
asking if he would insert a single paragraph (not part of the 
original four-paragraph concurrence) emphasizing the Fourth 
Amendment’s use of the word “reasonable” into his concurring 
opinion, to which Powell replied that he “preferred not” to make 
the addition.55 With the end of Term nearing, and with no 
evidence that he attempted to bargain with Stewart over opinion 
language before or after joining, Burger sent a memorandum to 
the Conference on June 29 withdrawing his joinder and noting 
that he “concluded to be simply shown as joining the judgment, 
without more.”56 As for the draft concurring statements, Burger 
wrote that he had “done several separate opinions, but looking 
at the whole picture I have decided none of them will add to the 
jurisprudence.”57 
End-of-term pressures, which Justice Louis Brandeis once 
indicated bring about “haste and fatigue,”58 may have also 
 
 51. Memorandum from Warren E. Burger to the Conference, No. 80-148 (May 6, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/80-148.pdf. 
 52. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Potter Stewart, No. 80-148 (June 10, 1981), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/80-148.pdf. 
 53. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Potter Stewart, No. 80-148 (June 12, 1981), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/80-148.pdf. 
 54. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Potter Stewart, No. 80-148 (June 22, 1981), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/80-148.pdf. 
 55. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Lewis F. Powell, No. 80-148 (June 23, 1981), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/80-148.pdf. 
 56. Memorandum from Warren E. Burger to the Conference, No. 80-148 (June 29, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/80-148.pdf. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, 
O.T. 1946-O.T. 1961, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 143, 148 (1980) (quoting Brandeis). 
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motivated a silent concurrence in Palmer v. City of Euclid.59 In 
Palmer, the Court issued a per curiam opinion concluding that a 
“suspicious person ordinance” was unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to a man “seen late at night in a parking lot . . . parked 
with his lights on, and us[ing] a two-way radio.”60 Two days after 
Justice White circulated a draft per curiam opinion, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II wrote that the case seemed “more difficult 
than I had first thought” and indicated that he would write 
separately while warning that “[t]his will take me a little time, 
because of other priorities.”61 More than one month later, after 
Justice Stewart circulated a concurring opinion joined by Justice 
Douglas while the other joined the per curiam, Harlan wrote to 
White with copies to the Conference: “After spending more time 
on this case than I should have, I have decided not to write and 
am content to go along with your result.”62 Harlan merely asked 
that the opinion note: “Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the 
result.”63 As with other instances, Harlan’s decision may have 
been informed by a belief about the case’s comparative 
unimportance. Given that per curiam opinions are typically 
reserved for short statements that make little precedential 
contribution, Harlan’s decision to focus on other efforts would 
be understandable.64 
While time constraints might be most prevalent near term’s 
end, collegial pressure to produce timely opinions is manifest 
throughout given the Court’s periodic and regular release of 
opinions. This may have played a role in motivating a silent 
concurrence in United States v. Cortez, where the Court held that 
certain facts and circumstantial evidence that a particular vehicle 
was being used to further criminal activity justified an 
investigative stop of that vehicle.65 On December 15, 1980, 
Justice Brennan sent Justice Marshall a note that read: “You and 
 
 59. 402 U.S. 544 (1971). 
 60. Id. at 544–45. 
 61. Letter from John Marshall Harlan II to Byron R. White, No. 70–143 (Apr. 8, 
1971), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1970/70-143.pdf. 
 62. Letter from John Marshall Harlan II to Byron R. White, No. 70–143 (May 13, 
1971). 
 63. Id. The per curiam also suggests that the case did not strike the Justices as 
particularly important. This is also evidenced by Justice Black’s decision to “acquiesce” 
in the result. Letter from Hugo Black to Bryon R. White, No. 70–143 (Apr. 8, 1971), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1970/70-143.pdf. 
 64. The per curiam opinion in Palmer totals about 500 words.  
 65. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).  
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I are in dissent in [Cortez]. I’ll be happy to undertake the dissent 
for us.”66 After Burger circulated a draft opinion for the Court 
on January 9, 1981, Brennan wrote to him on January 13 
indicating that he would join the opinion if he could make three 
changes.67 On the same day, Marshall wrote to Burger that he 
would “await the dissent.”68 Also on January 13, in a note that 
presumably arrived after Marshall wrote to Burger, Brennan 
informed Marshall that he “decided to join the Chief’s opinion if 
he adopts the suggestions [in his January 13 letter to Burger].”69 
Brennan subsequently joined Burger’s revised opinion on 
January 16.70 Later the same day, Burger wrote to Marshall: 
“Now that Bill Brennan has joined there will be no dissent 
unless you do so. All are now in. Should you join this case can 
come down next Wednesday.”71 On January 19, Marshall asked 
Burger to “add to the bottom of your opinion that I concur in 
the judgment.”72 The opinion was released on January 21 with 
Marshall’s noted concurrence. 
B. VOTE SWITCHING AND UNCERTAINTY 
The respective silent concurrences by Marshall and Powell 
in Cortez and Hathorn demonstrate that concurring without 
explanation may occur after a Justice switches votes. These 
decisions seem to be part of a more general manifestation of 
Justices concurring silently when they are uncertain about the 
proper case disposition or doctrinal rule. This may partially 
explain Burger’s silent concurrence in Robbins, for example, 
where the facts made for uneasy application of his preferred 
legal rule governing searches. Although vote switching may be 
motivated by policy concerns and institutional pressures, it is 
 
 66. Letter from William J. Brennan to Thurgood Marshall, No. 79-404 (Dec. 15, 
1980), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
 67. Letter from William J. Brennan to Warren E. Burger, No. 79-404 (Jan. 13, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
 68. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Warren E. Burger, No. 79-404 (Jan. 13, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
 69. Letter from William J. Brennan to Thurgood Marshall, No. 79-404 (Jan. 13, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
 70. Letter from William J. Brennan to Warren E. Burger, No. 79-404 (Jan. 16, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
 71. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Thurgood Marshall, No. 79-404 (Jan. 16, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
 72. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Warren E. Burger, No. 79-404 (Jan. 19, 
1981), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1980/79-404.pdf. 
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also driven by case complexity.73 Any number of idiosyncratic 
factors may lead a Justice to switch votes between Conference 
and release of the final opinion. When this happens, or when a 
Justice remains genuinely uncertain about the proper disposition 
or doctrinal rule, concurring without explanation may be an 
appealing alternative to joining a written opinion or otherwise 
writing separately. 
In Blackledge v. Allison, the Court reviewed a lower court 
judgment that a defendant could raise a claim that the 
prosecutor had not kept a promise made to induce a plea 
bargain and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that claim, 
despite having answered a series of questions when the plea was 
initially approved suggesting that there had been no unkept 
promise.74 With Justice Rehnquist not participating, the 
Conference vote was 4-4.75After Conference, Powell wrote to 
Burger with copies to the Conference: “At present, our options 
are limited to affirmance by an equally divided vote or to set the 
case for reargument. . . . [I]n the interest of avoiding these 
unattractive alternatives, I will change my vote to affirm.”76 With 
the vote now 5-3 to affirm, and with Burger in the minority, 
Brennan wrote to Burger: “If you adhere to your vote and 
therefore I am to assign the writing of the opinion for the Court, 
I assign it to [Powell].”77 The same day, however, Burger sent a 
memorandum to the Conference indicating that he too would 
now vote to affirm and assigned the opinion to Stewart.78 After 
Stewart circulated a draft opinion for the Court, however, 
 
 73. See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and 
Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996) (demonstrating 
that vote switching is driven by policy factors, institutional pressures, and uncertainty). 
See also Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 24 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 526 (1980); Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, Voting Fluidity and 
the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court Decision Making, 44 W. POL. Q. 119 (1991); J. 
Woodford Howard Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43 
(1968). 
 74. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).  
 75. Letter from Lewis F. Powell to Warren E. Burger, No. 75-1693 (Mar. 10, 1977), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf. 
 76. Id. Powell also noted that the decision had been a close call for him at 
Conference. 
 77. Letter from William J. Brennan to Warren E. Burger, No. 75-1693 (Mar. 10, 
1977), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf.  
 78. Memorandum from Warren E. Burger to the Conference, No. 75-1693 (Mar. 10, 
1977), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf. 
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Burger simply responded: “Please show me as concurring in the 
judgment.”79 
Burger’s silent concurrence in Blackledge is odd in two 
respects. First, he switched votes and assigned the opinion to 
Stewart (rather than staying with his initial vote and having 
Brennan assign the opinion to Powell), presumably because he 
favored Stewart’s approach. Although it is possible that Burger 
attempted to negotiate changes in Stewart’s opinion, there is no 
indication in the archival records that he made any effort on this 
front or otherwise considered writing a concurring opinion. 
Moreover, the case appears to have been written narrowly as 
Burger preferred,80 and as Powell seemed to demand in 
exchange for his switch to affirm.81 Indeed, White and 
Blackmun, the other Justices who initially voted to reverse, 
ultimately joined the majority opinion without separate 
comment.82 Although Burger might have switched votes solely to 
maintain control over opinion assignment,83 it is not clear from 
the records why he would have perceived a Stewart opinion to 
be more agreeable than a Powell opinion, the latter of whom, 
along with Burger himself, would have presumably been the 
“least persuaded.” A possible explanation for Burger’s silent 
concurrence is that he favored the majority disposition on 
 
 79.  Letter from Warren E. Burger to Potter Stewart, No. 75-1693 (Apr. 28, 1977), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf. 
 80. See Memorandum from Warren E. Burger to the Conference, No. 75-1693 
(Mar. 10, 1977), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-
1693.pdf. 
 81. See Letter from Lewis F. Powell to Warren E. Burger, No. 75-1693 (March 10, 
1977), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf. 
 82. Letter from Byron R. White to Potter Stewart, No. 75-1693 (Apr. 14, 1977), http
://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf. Justice Black-
mun, the other remaining Justice who initially voted to reverse, eventually joined 
Stewart’s opinion with the note: “I feel that you have arrived at a very reasonable 
resolution of this case, and I am glad to join your opinion.” Letter from Harry A. 
Blackmun to Potter Stewart, No. 75-1693 (Apr. 11, 1977), http://supremecourtopinions. 
wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1693.pdf. 
 83. For details on the strategic factors that may influence opinion assignment, see 
Saul Brenner, Strategic Choice and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court: A 
Reexamination, 35 WESTERN POL. Q. 204 (1982); Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, 
Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
276 (2007); Forest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion 
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551 (2004); Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy 
and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1729 
(2006). 
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balance, but preferred not to provide additional clout to the 
opinion by joining. 
Another vote switch leading to a silent concurrence 
occurred in Walter v. United States, where the Court considered 
whether federal law enforcement officials needed a search 
warrant to view obscene films mistakenly delivered by a private 
carrier to the wrong address.84 At Conference, five Justices voted 
to affirm the lower court decision that a search warrant was not 
necessary under these circumstances. After Conference, 
however, Justice Marshall switched his vote to reverse, creating 
a five-Justice majority for that judgment.85 One day after Justice 
Stevens circulated the first draft of an opinion for the Court 
about two months later, but before there was any bargaining 
over opinion content, Marshall asked for his concurrence in the 
judgment to be noted at the bottom of the opinion.86 Although 
the records do not indicate why Marshall favored this approach, 
his quick response, and decision not to bargain over opinion 
content in a case where his vote was outcome determinative, 
suggests that he might have been uncertain about the proper 
disposition or at least not particularly pleased with the doctrinal 
options.87 
 
 84. 447 U.S. 649 (1980). 
 85. Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, No. 79-67 (Mar. 3, 
1980), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-67.pdf. 
 86. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Stevens, No. 79-67 (May 2, 1980), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-67.pdf. 
 87. Marshall’s behavior is made somewhat more intriguing by the fact that the 
other four Justices voting to affirm at Conference also consented to a DIG. Although 
Powell initially suggested a DIG at Conference, the other three offered their support for 
that disposition on the same day that Marshall switched votes. See Memorandum from 
Burger to the Conference, No. 79-67 (Mar. 3, 1980), http://supremecourtopinions.
wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-67.pdf (supporting Powell’s Conference suggestion 
to DIG). See also Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger, No. 79-67 (Mar. 
3, 1980), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-67.pdf (stating 
he “could join a DIG”); Letter from William Rehnquist to Warren E. Burger, No. 79-67 
(Mar. 3, 1980), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-67.pdf 
(same). In light of these facts, the effort to DIG may have been a “heresthetical 
maneuver” designed to avoid losing on the merits. See generally Lee Epstein & Olga 
Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the U.S. Supreme Court, 14 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 93 (2002) (describing the use of procedural tools to split a winning coalition, 
particularly on the Burger Court). See also WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL 
MANIPULATION (1986) (discussing heresthetical maneuvers as attempts by losing 
coalitions to split winning coalitions and avoid defeat); Ryan C. Black et al., Trying to 
Get What You Want: Heresthetical Maneuvering and U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 66 POL. RES. Q. 819 (discussing heresthetical maneuvering during oral 
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Switching votes is not the only manifestation of uncertainty 
that may lead to silently concurring. Sometimes Justices are 
simply uncertain about the proper disposition or legal rule and 
seem to use silent concurrences as a hedge. Although little 
known or used, the “dubitante” designation allows Justices to 
express doubt about the correct result rather than writing or 
signing on to a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion.88 
Chief Justice Burger once analogized his silent concurrence to a 
dubitante designation. In Andrus v. Allard, the Court reversed a 
lower court judgment invalidating regulations promulgated 
under two conservation statutes prohibiting commercial 
transactions in parts of birds legally killed prior to the statutes 
being passed.89 Although Burger voted to affirm at Conference, 
he later wrote to Justice Brennan, the opinion’s author, that he 
had been “persuaded” to distinguish an important precedent, 
but added: “the best I can do is join the judgment. In that 
‘dubitante’ status!, I am more comfortable joining only the 
judgment.”90 This suggested that Burger’s reservations persisted 
despite formally switching his vote. 
Chief Justice Burger also seemed uncertain about his vote 
in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States.91 In Bose 
Corp., the Court affirmed a lower court judgment evaluating a 
claim of “actual malice” in a product disparagement suit de novo 
rather than using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
“clearly-erroneous” standard of review.92 Although Burger 
voted to reverse at Conference, shortly thereafter he sent a 
memorandum to the Conference indicating that “[f]urther 
consideration, particularly on the points Lewis [Powell] made at 
 
argument); Greg Goelzhauser, Avoiding Constitutional Cases, 39 AM. POL. RES. 483, 511 
(2011) (discussing the use of justiciability doctrines in heresthetical maneuvers). 
 88.  See Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2006) 
(detailing use of the dubitante designation in state and federal courts). 
 89. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).  
 90. Letter from Warren E. Burger to William J. Brennan, No. 78-740 (Nov. 19, 
1979), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/78-740.pdf. Justice 
Stevens had also voted to affirm at Conference, but later switched his vote, suggesting to 
Brennan that he had been persuaded by the majority opinion. Letter from John Paul 
Stevens to William J. Brennan, No. 78-740 (Oct. 31, 1979), http://
supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/78-740.pdf. 
 91. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
 92. Id. 
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Conference, persuades me to vote to affirm in this case.”93 Four 
months later, Justice Stevens circulated a draft opinion for the 
Court, and Justice Rehnquist circulated a draft dissent about one 
month later. About two weeks after Rehnquist’s dissent 
circulated, Burger informed Stevens that “[t]he dissent has given 
me a good deal of trouble and I conclude that I will join only in 
the judgment.”94 
C. VOTING CONSISTENCY AND PRECEDENT 
Other silent concurrences seem to be driven primarily by a 
desire to maintain a degree of voting consistency across cases. 
As the examples below illustrate, this type of silent concurrence 
raises an interesting theoretical issue regarding the influence of 
precedent on subsequent decision making. In the ongoing 
empirical debate over the extent to which precedent influences 
judicial decision making,95 one of the key tests has been whether 
Justices change their voting behavior after dissenting in previous 
cases.96 The logic behind this test is that a precedent becomes 
binding once decided and should therefore be followed in 
subsequent cases even by those who initially dissented.97 The 
examples that follow demonstrate that silent concurrences can 
serve as a type of middle ground between joining an opinion that 
follows the previous precedent and writing a dissenting opinion 
revisiting settled principles. 
 
 93. Memorandum from Warren E. Burger to the Conference, No. 82-1246 (Nov. 11, 
1983).  
 94. Letter from Warren E. Burger to John Paul Stevens, No. 82-1246 (Apr. 26, 
1984).  
 95. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED 
COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); PACELLE, JR. ET 
AL., supra note 19. Brandon L. Bartels, The Constraining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 474 (2009); Brandon L. Bartels & 
Andrew J. O’Green, The Nature of Legal Change on the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Jurisprudential Regimes Theory and Its Alternatives, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 880 (2015); 
Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly T. Rader, Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making: 
Do Jurisprudential Regimes Exist?, 72 J. POL. 273 (2010); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 305 (2002). 
 96. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY 
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999). 
 97. Of course, the dichotomy of following versus not following precedent is over 
simplified given that most subsequent cases, particularly before the Supreme Court, deal 
with new factual scenarios that the previous precedent may not reach. 
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In Vlandis v. Kline, the Court held that a state statute fixing 
residence for college tuition purposes at the moment of 
application violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.98 Although Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court 
referred to the statute as one that set an “irrebuttable 
presumption,”99 a dissenting opinion written by Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas, 
rejected the concept in favor of the view that the state had 
merely required applicants to demonstrate a prior connection to 
the state in order to qualify for in-state tuition.100 The following 
Term, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court 
held that mandatory paternity leave policies violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.101 Justice Stewart 
wrote the majority opinion in LaFleur, and cited the 
“irrebuttable presumption” aspect of Vlandis for support.102 
Although Rehnquist wrote another dissenting opinion, joined 
again by Burger, criticizing Stewart’s “quixotic engagement in 
his apparently unending war on irrebuttable presumptions,”103 
Justice Douglas joined Stewart’s opinion.104 However, after 
Justice Powell, who joined Stewart’s opinion in Vlandis, 
circulated a concurring opinion noting that he had “re-
examine[d] the ‘irrebuttable presumption’ rationale… [and] 
conclu[ded] that the Court should approach that doctrine with 
extreme care,”105 Douglas had second thoughts. He wrote to 
Stewart: “As you know I joined your opinion [in LaFleur] but 
Lewis’ separate opinion stirs in me some of the doubts I had in 
Vlandis where I was in dissent. So I have decided to withdraw 
my concurrence with you in LaFleur and ask you to note at the 
end that I concur in the result.”106 
In McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Court clarified the role that 
standby counsel may play in assisting a pro se defendant over the 
defendant’s objection.107 The case was progeny to Farretta v. 
 
 98. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
 99. Id. at 454.  
 100. Id. at 466 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 101. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
 102. Id. at 644.  
 103. Id. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 104. Letter from John Paul Douglas to Potter Stewart, No. 72-777 (Dec. 4, 1973).  
 105. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 652 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 106. Letter from John Paul Douglas to Potter Stewart, No. 72-777 (Jan. 18, 1974).  
 107. 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
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California, decided nearly a decade earlier, recognizing a 
defendant’s constitutional right to pro se representation while 
also allowing trial courts to appoint standby counsel for 
assistance if needed.108 The dissenting opinion in McKaskle, 
signed by three members of the Farretta majority, lamented 
“that the Court’s test is unworkable and insufficiently protective 
of the fundamental interests we recognized in Farretta.”109 
Moreover, Justice Blackmun, a dissenter in Farretta, wrote to 
Justice O’Connor, McKaskle’s author, that he was “pleased to 
see the Court cutting back a good bit on Farretta.”110 
Nonetheless, Blackmun did not join O’Connor’s opinion, 
seemingly out of a desire to maintain a consistent position 
against Farretta. Blackmun wrote: “I, of course, am no fan of 
Farretta. …The present litigation and other cases that will follow 
are its progeny and will give us difficulty. Will you therefore, at 
the end of your opinion, add ‘Justice Blackmun concurs in the 
result.’”111 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Court developed standards 
for evaluating a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim and applied those standards to reverse a circuit court’s 
decision to grant habeas in a particular case.112 Justice Marshall 
issued a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority’s analytical 
framework and voting to affirm the circuit court’s habeas 
decision.113 In United States v. Cronic, decided on the same day 
as Strickland, the Court unanimously reversed a lower court 
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel without making 
specific determinations based on conduct or errors made at trial, 
and remanded for new proceedings.114 Two days after Justice 
Stevens circulated a draft opinion for the Court in Cronic, 
Justice Marshall joined.115 Nearly one month later, however, 
Marshall wrote to Stevens: “I have just reread your opinion in 
[Cronic] along with my dissent in [Strickland]. I conclude that I 
 
 108. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 109. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 195 (White, J., dissenting). 
 110. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor, No. 82-1135 (Dec. 
30, 1983), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-1135.pdf.  
 111. Id.  
 112. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 113. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 114. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
 115. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to John Paul Stevens, No. 82-660 (Mar. 14, 
1984), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-660.pdf. 
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must withdraw my join in the opinion of the Court in Cronic. I 
concur only in the judgment.”116 Although the Court’s opinion in 
Cronic did not explicitly rest on Strickland, and mentions of the 
latter appear only in footnotes, the remand in Cronic allowed 
the defendant to make specific arguments for ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial that would have been analyzed by 
the lower court using standards set out in Strickland.117 This 
tension may have led Marshall to note his concurrence in the 
judgment in order to avoid implying that he supported this 
approach on remand. 
A similar disagreement with previous precedent may have 
led to Chief Justice Burger’s silent concurrence in American 
Export Lines v. Alvez, where the Court affirmed a lower court 
judgment concluding that maritime law authorizes a harbor 
worker’s spouse to sue for damages when that worker is non-
fatally injured on a vessel in state territorial waters.118 Several 
terms prior to the Court’s decision in Alvez, it held in Sea-Land 
Services v. Gaudet that maritime law authorizes a widow’s 
recovery for wrongful death of a spouse even when the deceased 
recovered damages before dying.119 Thus, Alvez marked a fairly 
straightforward application of Gaudet. Concurring in Alvez, for 
example, Powell wrote that he thought Gaudet “was decided 
wrongly,” but nonetheless “recognize[d] the utility of stare 
decisis in cases of this kind” and could “see no rational basis for 
drawing a distinction between fatal and nonfatal injuries.”120 
In Gaudet, Burger joined a dissenting opinion authored by 
Powell that criticized the majority for, among other things, its 
“unprecedented extensions of admiralty law [that] exhibit little 
deference for stare decisis.”121 At Conference in Alvez, Powell 
voted to reverse. However, he later wrote to Stewart and 
Rehnquist, both of whom also dissented in Gaudet: “I continue 
to ‘gag’ a bit when I think about the Court’s decision in Gaudet. 
Yet, Gaudet remains on the books, and we do not have five votes 
to reverse it. Accordingly, I have concluded reluctantly that I 
 
 116. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to John Paul Stevens, No. 82-660 (May 11, 
1984), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-660.pdf. 
 117. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666 n.41.  
 118. 446 U.S. 274 (1980). 
 119. 414 U.S. 573 (1974). 
 120. Alvez, 446 U.S. at 274 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 121. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 596 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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should follow at least to the extent of joining the judgment in 
this case.”122 Although Powell went on to publish the perfunctory 
concurrence referenced above, this sentiment may explain 
Burger’s decision to silently concur in Alvez. Given that 
Rehnquist and Stewart joined a dissenting opinion in Alvez 
arguing that the Court did not have jurisdiction due to lack of 
finality, no Justice in the Gaudet minority joined Brennan’s 
opinion in Alvez. 
Burger’s decision to concur without opinion in Alvez may 
have been made easier by the fact that the Justices seemed to 
consider the case of little importance. Blackmun indicated as 
much with his vote to affirm. At Conference, Blackmun 
expressed doubts as to whether the Court had jurisdiction, but 
indicated that if the Court reached the merits he would vote to 
affirm.123 Upon joining Brennan’s majority opinion in Alvez, 
Blackmun signaled his impression of the case’s importance when 
he wrote: “Any reservation I may continue to have about 
finality—and hence jurisdiction here—ought to be assuaged by 
the very narrow facts of this case. Surely the decision will cause 
us no precedential embarrassment.”124 
D. OPINION LANGUAGE AND SCOPE 
Silent concurrences may also be in part a response to 
disagreement over opinion language or scope. That Justices 
bargain over opinion content is well known.125 When bargaining 
breakdowns occur, however, written concurrences are a common 
result.126 Alternatively, in conjunction with other factors such as 
 
 122. Letter from Lewis F. Powell to Potter Stewart, No. 79-1 (Apr. 14, 1980), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-1.pdf. 
 123. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to William J. Brennan, No. 79-1 (Mar. 4, 1980), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-1.pdf. Blackmun seems 
to have meant that he would not join the dissent, which focused exclusively on 
jurisdiction. In his letter to Brennan, Blackmun indicated that it was not uncommon for a 
Justice to reach the merits despite harboring concern about jurisdiction if a majority was 
otherwise inclined to reach the merits. After describing his own posture, Blackmun 
wrote: “I have done this on at least one other occasion, as did John Harlan. I think others 
have done it, too.” Id.  
 124. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to William J. Brennan, No. 79-1 (Apr. 11, 
1980), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/79-1.pdf. 
 125. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
 126. CORLEY, supra note 14. 
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time constraints and perceptions of case importance, Justices 
may simply concur silently. One comparatively unimportant 
dispute over word choice led to a silent concurrence in Army & 
Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, where the Court held 
that the Tucker Act did not confer federal jurisdiction over a 
civil damages claim brought by a former military employee 
contesting his discharge.127 After Justice Blackmun circulated a 
draft opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger sent him a 
private note that read in part: “I have tried—and I think 
succeeded in getting almost everyone to avoid the term plea 
‘bargain.’ That word has no place in the judicial vocabulary. I 
can join your opinion heartily if you can change ‘bargain’. . . to 
‘negotiations.’”128 Burger concluded with an ultimatum: “So, 
show me accordingly as joining or joining the judgment.”129 
Blackmun refused Burger’s request, suggesting that the phrase 
had “acquired an accepted meaning in the judicial vocabulary” 
and was “far more accepted than the noun ‘commute’ for which 
I fought a battle . . . when no one supported me, and surely is far 
more acceptable than the Court’s constant misuse of the word 
‘viable.’”130 Blackmun closed by citing several opinions Burger 
had joined that included the phrase “plea bargain,” to which 
Burger playfully responded: “Yes, but I’ve joined the last one. It 
is a perversion of the English language [and] the law!”131 As a 
result of this exchange, appended to the end of Blackmun’s 
otherwise unanimous opinion in Sheehan is the line: “The Chief 
Justice concurs in the judgment.”132 
Other differences over opinion language leading to 
disagreements without explanation involve more serious 
matters. In these instances, bargaining requests may be implicit 
or explicit. Justice Blackmun’s requests to Justice O’Connor in 
Engle discussed previously are good examples of explicit 
 
 127. 456 U.S. 728 (1982). 
 128. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun, No. 80-1437 (May 19, 
1982), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1437.pdf. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger, No. 80-1437 (May 20, 
1982), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1437.pdf. For 
more on Blackmun’s quest to ensure proper usage of the term “viable,” see Greg 
Goelzhauser, Justice Blackmun’s Blood Oath, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 163 (2015).  
 131. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger, No. 80-1437 (May 20, 
1982), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1437.pdf 
(emphasis in the original). 
 132.  Sheehan, 456 U.S. at 741.  
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requests. And in United States v. Mason,133 Justice Douglas 
informed Justice Marshall that he “would join . . . if the two 
paragraphs that start on p. 8 were deleted. If not, just note that I 
concur in the result.”134 Marshall refused to accommodate the 
request, and the Court’s opinion in Mason simply notes that 
“Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.”135 An implicit 
request occurred in Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action 
at the Local Level,136 where Chief Justice Burger wrote to Justice 
Stewart: “As for now, show me as concurring in the judgment. I 
am, of course, in complete agreement with the result, but I am 
troubled by several points.”137 Burger then detailed three 
concerning aspects of the opinion, including specific language, 
but Stewart left the opinion unchanged and Burger abided by his 
concurrence in the judgment.138 
A silent concurrence may also be the result of disagreement 
over what certain language means. In Ball v. United States, the 
Court unanimously held that a felon could not be convicted and 
concurrently sentenced under separate statutes prohibiting 
felons from receiving and possessing a firearm in interstate 
commerce.139 After Chief Justice Burger circulated a draft 
opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall wrote that he was “still 
up in the air about your opinion” and pointed specifically to 
what he considered to be conflicting statements.140 One read: “‘It 
is clear that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously 
for violations of [both statutes] involving the same firearm’”; the 
other: “‘Congress seems clearly to have recognized that a felon 
who receives a firearm must also possess it, and thus had no 
intention of subjecting that person to two convictions for the 
same criminal act.’”141 Marshall closed by writing: “While I am in 
general agreement with the whole opinion there are apparent 
conflicts such as the two I mention that make me hesitate. Please 
 
 133. 412 U.S. 391 (1973). 
 134. Letter from William O. Douglas to Thurgood Marshall. No. 72-654 (May 24, 
1973), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1972/72-606.pdf. 
 135. Mason, 412 U.S. at 400. 
 136. 430 U.S. 259 (1977). 
 137. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Potter Stewart, No. 75-1157 (Mar. 3, 1977), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1976/75-1157.pdf. 
 138. Lockport, 430 U.S. at 273.  
 139. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).  
 140. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Warren E. Burger, No. 84-5004 (Mar. 15, 
1985), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1984/84-5004.pdf. 
 141. Id.  
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help me out.”142 Burger replied by distinguishing the first 
statement as having to do with “prosecutions,” while the second 
dealt with “convictions,” concluding: “no conflict at all!!”143 As a 
result of this communication breakdown, the opinion in Ball 
simply noted that “Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment.”144 
There are also instances where Justices silently concur due 
to differences over opinion language or scope without 
attempting to bargain or even identify the troubling passages. In 
Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court 
held that a city ordinance criminalizing picketing near primary 
or secondary school buildings during certain times, while making 
an exception for picketing during labor disputes, violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.145 The 
ordinance was passed after a federal postal employee began 
peacefully picketing a local high school for its alleged racially 
discriminatory practices.146 Although Rehnquist and Blackmun 
voted at conference to uphold the ordinance, Rehnquist 
ultimately wrote to Justice Marshall, who wrote for the majority, 
with a note that read: “Your opinion has convinced me that even 
under my view of the equal protection clause, there is no basis 
for the labor union exception to this picketing ordinance.”147 
However, Rehnquist also added: “Since I can’t join in some of 
the broader statements in your opinion, will you show me as 
concurring in the result.”148 
In Lau v. Nichols, the Court considered whether a school 
district’s decision to offer supplemental English language 
courses to some, but not all, students of Chinese ancestry who 
did not speak English violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.149 
Although the lower court upheld the policy on both grounds,150 
the Justices voted at Conference to reverse on the statutory 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Ball, 470 U.S. at 865.  
 145. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 146. Id. at 93 (noting that the protests alleged “black discrimination” and were a 
“lonely crusade [that] was always peaceful, orderly, and quiet”). 
 147. Letter from William Rehnquist to Thurgood Marshall, No. 70-87 (June 6, 1972), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-87.pdf.  
 148. Id. Justice Blackmun also concurred in the result without explanation. Mosley, 
408 U.S. at 102 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 149. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 150. Id. at 565.  
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question—leaving the constitutional issue undecided.151 After 
Justice Douglas circulated his draft opinion for the Court, 
however, several Justices voiced concern about the extent to 
which the opinion addressed the constitutional question and 
made various degrees of threats to withhold joinder until it 
focused exclusively on the statutory issue.152 Douglas made 
subsequent edits to the opinion, including explicitly stating “[w]e 
do not reach the Equal Protection Clause argument . . . but rely 
solely on . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964…to reverse the Court 
of Appeals,”153 but Justice White nonetheless informed him that 
“[t]he equal protection thesis still shows through . . . too much 
for me to join” and asked that it be noted that he “concurs in the 
judgment, solely on the statutory ground.”154 Notwithstanding 
White’s desire to have what might be considered a perfunctory 
concurrence noted, the final opinion simply notes that “Mr. 
Justice White concurs in the result.”155 
In United States v. United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division, the Court 
unanimously held that certain government surveillance 
regarding domestic affairs was unlawful.156 Unlike cases that 
seem comparatively unimportant, the first sentence of the 
Court’s opinion indicates that “[t]he issue before us is an 
important one for the people of our country and their 
Government.”157 While the Justices were unanimous at 
Conference with respect to the result, three Justices (Blackmun, 
Burger, and White) voted to rest the decision on the statutory 
ground alone, while five Justices (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, 
Stewart, and Powell) did not consider the statute dispositive and 
 
 151. See Letter from Warren E. Burger to William O. Douglas, No. 72-6520 (Jan. 2, 
1974), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1973/72-6520.pdf.  
 152. See Id. See also Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to William O. Douglas, No. 72-
6520 (Dec. 26, 1973), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/ 
1973/72-6520.pdf; Letter from Lewis F. Powell to William O. Douglas, No. 72-6520 (Jan. 
9, 1974), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1973/72-6520.pdf; 
Letter from William Rehnquist to William O. Douglas, No. 72-6520 (Dec. 28, 1973), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1973/72-6520.pdf. 
 153. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566. 
 154. Letter from Byron R. White to William O. Douglas, No. 72-6520 (Jan. 2, 1974), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1973/72-6520.pdf. 
 155. Lau, 414 U.S at 569. 
 156. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).  
 157. Id. at 299. 
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preferred to rest on the constitutional ground.158 Although 
convention dictated that Douglas would assign the opinion as 
the majority coalition’s senior Justice, Burger apparently asked 
White to undertake a draft opinion for Conference 
consideration.159 This prompted a private note from Douglas to 
Burger stating that “the assignment to Byron (much as I love my 
friend) is not [] appropriate.”160 Douglas continued: 
With all respect, I think Powell represents the consensus. I 
have not canvassed everybody, but I am sure that Byron, who 
goes on the statute, will not get a court. To save time, may I 
suggest you have a huddle and see to it that Powell gets the 
opinion to write? Or if you want me to suggest an assignment, 
that would be mine.161 
Burger replied to Douglas later that day with copies to the 
Conference, stating that he could “see no reason why Lewis 
should not undertake to write and see what support his position 
achieves,” adding: “I am not as clear on Lewis’ position as your 
memo suggests but I would be happy if his view could command 
a majority.”162 However, Burger also suggested “there may be 
much likelihood of Byron’s securing substantial support” and 
reiterated his “request that Byron proceed to write.”163 This 
prompted Douglas to write Powell, making explicit what had 
been implicit in his previous note to Burger: 
Traditionally an opinion [in circumstances like these] 
would . . . be in the province of the senior Justice to assign. 
That was not done in this case and the matter is of no 
consequence to me as a matter of pride and privilege—but I 
think it makes a tremendous difference in the result. I am 
writing you this note hoping that you will put on paper the 
ideas you expressed in Conference and I am sure you will get 
a majority.164 
 
 158. See Letter from William O. Douglas to Warren E. Burger, No. 70-153 (Mar. 6, 
1972), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-153.pdf. 
 159. See id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Letter from Warren E. Burger to William O. Douglas, No. 70-153 (Mar. 6, 
1972), http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-153.pdf. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Letter from William O. Douglas to Potter Stewart, No. 70-153 (Mar. 8, 1972), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-153.pdf. 
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In the end, six Justices joined Powell’s opinion and White 
concurred only in the judgment, arguing that the case could be 
disposed on statutory grounds. Burger ultimately refused to join 
either opinion, asking instead that he be shown as concurring in 
the result and telling Powell that he found “too much of the 
language” he could not join.165 
CONCLUSION 
The silent concurrence is puzzling. Although the existence 
of this practice has been recognized, scholars have been unable 
to explain why Justices sometimes silently concur rather than 
write separately or acquiesce. The primary difficulty with 
studying silent concurrences is that explanations for this practice 
are not made public by definition. Leveraging the Justices’ 
personal papers, it appears that myriad factors precipitate this 
practice, including time constraints, perceptions about case 
importance, reluctant vote switching, uncertainty about the 
proper disposition or legal rule, a desire to maintain voting 
consistency while withholding support for disfavored precedents, 
and bargaining failures over opinion language and scope. Often 
more than one of these factors seem to be at play in motivating 
the decision to concur silently. 
Important questions remain for future research. As an 
initial matter, Justices have also issued silent dissents throughout 
the Court’s history.166 Indeed, silent dissents may have played an 
important intermediate role moving from the breakdown in a 
norm of consensus to full development of a norm of writing 
separately when in disagreement. Although the reasons for 
silently concurring and dissenting are likely to be similar in 
particular cases, there may be important differences as well. 
Uncovering the reasons for Justices silently dissenting will 
require access to private materials such as the Justices’ papers. 
Perusal of the archival records for Justices serving on the Burger 
Court suggests that silent dissents were much less common than 
 
 165. Letter from Warren E. Burger to Lewis F. Powell, No. 70-153 (May 26, 1972), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-153.pdf. 
 166. See, e.g., WOLFMAN, ET AL., supra note 27 (discussing several silent dissents 
issued by Justice Douglas in tax cases). 
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their concurring counterparts by this period, making it difficult 
to draw inferences about this behavior from this era.167 
The relative paucity of noted dissents compared to 
concurrences during the Burger Court raises questions about 
how often Justices issue these notations of disagreement and 
how the institutional practice has changed over time. 
Unfortunately, there is no systematic information available 
regarding variation in the use of silent concurrences and dissents 
across Justices or time. At a minimum, the practice continues on 
the contemporary Court’s “shadow docket.”168 Although costly 
to collect, comprehensive data on silent concurrences and 
dissents would allow scholars to recover information about an 
important opinion delivery practice that has thus far received 
very little sustained scholarly attention. 
Of course, data on the issuance of noted dissents and 
concurrences would not provide much insight into case-specific 
justifications for engaging in this practice. Additional insight on 
this front will require access to private materials such as those 
employed here. In addition to providing more information about 
the practice, additional archival evidence may help determine 
whether the justifications offered here are time bound. There is 
a reasonable concern, for example, that the Burger Court is not 
representative of other eras. That the archival records discussed 
here involve Justices who served before and after Burger 
somewhat assuages this concern. Nonetheless, the Burger Court 
is often thought to be among the least harmonious in terms of 
collegial relations. Although fractured Justices may be more or 
less likely to note their disagreement, interpersonal discord 
seems more likely to influence the number of noted 
disagreements than fundamentally alter the reasons for noting 
disagreement. 
While each of these questions highlights important avenues 
for future research, this article marks an important step forward 
in developing our understanding of silent disagreement. 
Understandably, the burgeoning literature on separate opinions 
has focused almost exclusively on the written variety. But the 
 
 167. But see Letter from Hugo Black to Warren E. Burger, No. 206 (Jan. 5, 1971); 
Letter from William O. Douglas to Lewis F. Powell, No. 71-1022 (Feb. 9, 1973).  
 168. William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& LIBERTY 1 (2015). 
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practice has played a role in Supreme Court decision making 
throughout its history and persists to some degree into the 
modern era as exemplified by Justice Alito’s silent concurrence 
in L.A. County Flood Control District. As scholars continue to 
develop a more complete understanding of silent disagreement 
as manifested by graveyard dissents and noted concurrences or 
dissents, a fascinating portrait emerges of Justices engaging in 
the pursuit of various personal and institutional goals. This 
picture enhances our understanding of judicial behavior, and the 
interpersonal dynamics that shape the Supreme Court’s output. 
